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І. Пініч

кандидат філологічних наук,
доцент кафедри германської
і фіно-угорської філології
імені професора Г.Г. Почепцова
Київського національного
лінгвістичного університету

NEGATIVE SELF-CONSCIOUS MORAL EMOTIONS IN CONSTRUCTING VICTORIAN MORAL IDENTITY (A CORPUS-BASED STUDY)

> *Morality is a human construction that issues from our passions. But that doesn't mean that we have to give up [27].*

1. Introduction

Numerous more *recent findings* in linguistics [26; 28], philosophy [27; 33] and psychology [9; 29] on sentimentalism of morality, though not exclusively, derive from the assumptions of British moral philosophy within which the psychological issues of the nature of moral judgments were primarily raised. Early classical sentimentalists referred to the notion of moral senses and recognized innate or natural sentiments of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries as harmonious motives which move a person to act for the "very reason of worthiness and honesty of the action" [19].

The shift in the sentimentalism theory from the moral senses to the mechanisms of their generation discerned in the phenomenon of sympathy was expounded on by Hume and Smith [19]. The empathetic feelings were endowed with more prominence in an attempt to restore the psychological unity of society members under the idea of virtuous morals. Nevertheless, the presumption on the innateness of the senses advocated by the 18th century moral sense theorists may purportedly reside in the well-established religious ideologemes [24] with the already internalized suggestive patterns of making judgments. Sympathy foregrounding, therefore, testified to the rise of new moral ideologemes that signaled loosening of the linkage within the system of religious virtue ethics. Notwithstanding that, the weakening of the ties did not yield instantaneous deterioration of the system of virtues, but evinced the acquisition of its original psychological impetus by Victorian moral values of temperance, thrift, patriotism, honesty, and piety.

The current study revolves around the hypothesis about the significance of emotions in ideological transition mechanisms and further ideology cultivation. The previous study on the involvement of positive moral emotions in the rise of Victorian morality [25] has shown a significant bias to negative moral and non-moral emotions in the inculcation of the ideology. Therefore, *this paper investigates* the impact of the emotional zeal of negative self-conscious emotions in facilitating and promulgating the ideology of VICTORIAN MORALITY. *The objectives* of the paper involve: 1) examining the relation of lexical representation of negative moral emotions to religious, social, and Victorian ethical linguoideologemes; 2) establishing consistency of ideologemes transition fostered by the emotional fervour of internalized self-conscious emotions.

In pursuing the goal of the paper, 56 novels of the Victorian era were selected from the Corpus Of Late Modern English Texts (CLMET 3.1), offered by its authors [5]. A machine-based qualitative content-analysis has been implemented by employing free text mining software KH Coder. The procedure consists of the following stages:

1) preliminary writing of coding rules for negative moral emotions of guilt, shame, and embarrassment. The coding rules encompass ideographic synonyms that were retrieved from the online thesaurus dictionary brought by Thesaurus.com;

2) implementing KH Coder word association tool and subsequent filtering of the results by the part of speech, leaving only nouns;

3) filtering edges and setting the degree of co-occurrence to establish the plausible linkage among the lexical representations of ideologemes under analysis;

4) configuring co-occurrence networks by highlighting the minimum spanning tree, based on Prim method, to feature the most significant links;

5) opting for eigenvector centrality color coding where the nodes are coloured from light blue to white to pink with a respective increase of the centrality value;

6) in-depth examining of word association results with the help of concordancing, and filtering words by minimal differential frequency of 1;

7) generating network charts of 20–30 nodes for the convenience of graphical representation;

8) analyzing machine-generated co-occurrence networks in testing the hypothesis of negative moral emotions impetus in cultivating the moral identity of the Victorian era.

2. Victorian moral identity: internalization and symbolization

In moral psychology, the notion of moral identity is defined with regard to the centrality of moral behaviour to an individual's identity [10; 1]. It follows that moral judgments and moral actions of an individual are predicated on

the significance of moral schemas recognized in a society with an ultimate goal of integrating the self with morality [18, p. 165]. The integration can be realized in two dimensions – internalization and symbolization [1] – within private and public aspects of the self respectively.

The mechanisms of morality internalization translate to the instilment of mental images of a moral person for further self-praising and self-censuring practices. Therefore, the personological perspective of moral identity involves the study of the structure and contents of the identity including organization, maturity, and phenomenological experience of the self, their personal values and goals [23].

Victorian fictional novels are deemed abundant in shedding light on the issues of identity organization which dwells primarily on the conflict of the "inner self" as opposed to the symbolic self [21]. The contradictory structure evolves as a result of the waning religious ideology, leaving the residue of the altruistic identity with its virtuous morality in the rise of the superimposed symbolic identity of Victorian morality. Noticeably, the transitory co-existence of the two ideologies is substantiated by the resilience of religion as an efficient behaviour predictor ranking on a par with the newly rising utilitarianism, consumerism, and the social standing.

The moral centrality in an individual's identity involves the understanding of moral identities "as moral self-representations in autobiographical memory" [10, p. 499] and moral exemplars [36]. Moral self-representations are imbued with a particular moral meaning through moral emotions and are stored in moral self-narratives. The self-representations of the Victorian moral identity bear the traces of socially constructed images that disguise the true self behind the mask of decorum and social respectability. Therefore, the sublayers of the Victorian identity unsheathe the "instinctive" prudential morality [21] evincing its reference to the donor ideology.

The mechanism of giving greater prominence to the symbolic self might perform an adaptive function or serve as a "response to the social pressures of particular relevance" [29]. Therefore, the mimesis of the imagined identity presumably originates in the communally recognized aspiration to the ideal self either as an exemption from guilt and shame, the negative self-conscious moral emotions, or a consolidation under the just virtuous anger at sinners.

Moral identities rendered as exemplars from a social-cognitive perspective are construed as self-schemas that trigger a commitment to morality and motivate future behaviours of the self [12; 36]. The prescriptive nature of emotions that favour sustainability of moral identities inflicts self-policing and underpins self-determination. Victorian moral exemplars involve championing morality and ethics and disapproving of highly condemned vices [14, p. 5], all substantiated by the significance of "emotional conditioning" [27]. To illustrate, such other-condemning emotions as anger and contempt serve as essential tools in inculcating cultural morality schemas within the shared society. The internalization of the schemas via the fictional novels of the time is achieved primarily through the mechanisms of emotional attitudes rather than moral reasoning. Subsequently, the efficiency of proliferating ideas on NATIONAL SUPREMACY, PIETY, THRIFT, PATRIOTISM, HONESTY, and DUTY [24, p. 292] resides in the emotional infusion of their relevance in the contemporary society.

Other social-cognitive accounts of moral identity recognize its place within a paradigm of multiple social identities of the self that relate to the public dimension of the identity. Therefore, the preeminence of ideological commitment is exponential in self-definition and thus, in the choice of moral standards. Additionally, the developmental claims of moral identity establish a strong link between self-determination and interpersonal, ideological thinking about morals [10, p. 505]. Subsequently, moral reasoning along with moral standards and self-sanctions can be embraced similarly to other social identities for constructing self-definitions and establishing correlation to the moral identity: egoistic, altruistic or utilitarian.

3. Negative moral emotions

Emotions are indispensable in moral assessments that are not exclusively private emotional reactions but rally around interpersonal agreement in moral judgments endowing them with a more top-down standardization than virtue imbued bottom-up emergence. Moral behaviour can therefore be understood as an outcome of moral identity stipulated by situational factors that trigger the access to internalized moral self-schemas [3, p. 9] of ideologically prescribed patterns and are galvanized by moral emotions.

According to Prinz, moral response is of major significance in carrying out moral judgments of either one's own actions or others' behaviour [27] both in terms of denunciation of moral violations and approbation of morally responsible behaviour. Therefore, the repertoire of the responses involves both positive moral emotions triggered by the recognition of appropriate moral behaviour, and negative moral emotions infused as a result of moral indignation.

Negative moral emotions, according to Haidt, fall into two major families: other-condemning and self-conscious [9]. Other-focused negative emotions occupy the place of prototypical moral emotions in the classification as they demonstrate high prosociality of action tendency and high disinterestedness of elicitors [9]. Occasionally recognized as undifferentiated response to moral actions [22], from a social-functional perspective the negative moral emotions are claimed "differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in the consequent actions and judgements" [16]. The inventory of other-condemning moral emotions consists of anger, disgust [22; 9; 34], and contempt [9; 34]. The moral importance and the function of other-focused negative moral emotions would require a separate study in the mechanisms of Victorian moral ideology inculcation.

Self-conscious negative moral emotions are viewed in Freudian tradition as disruptive to normal moral development though, Hoffman and Eisenberg define them as central to prosocial behaviour [7; 15]. Fessler argues that these emotions are "quintessentially other-oriented, as how one feels about oneself is contingent on others' assessment" [8, p. 187], and they are anchored to the feeling of remorse triggered by harm to others. Among the commonly differentiated negative self-conscious emotions are shame, guilt and embarrassment [9; 34; 35], the list may also include envy, jealousy, and

ressentiment (bitterness) [8]. The scope of our scholarly interests within this study refers mainly to the role of guilt, shame, and embarrassment in Victorian ideology proliferation.

3.1. Negative self-conscious emotions in fostering Victorian morality: Guilt and shame

The moral importance of guilt in the Victorian society owes to the deeply internalized sense of guilt taken to its extreme which is referred to as "Christian guilt neurosis" [6, p. 357]. Although, the Victorian morality system deployed an extensive network of the propriety rules based on the cultivated experience of shame and embarrassment under conditions of breaching the etiquette. Therefore, the rise of the "guilt-culture" [6, p. 357] was substantiated by a deeper internalization of shame as an instrument of social regulation of internal consciousness and a substitute for solidarity generator. Subsequently, the Protestant morality that doesn't allow for atonement and defines the sinful nature of the person, established the principles of the guilt-culture, propagating individual consiousness and individual responsibility. The individualization increase was a hallmark of the transformation of a shame-culture into a guilt-culture that reached its culmination, according to Dein, by the beginning of the 19th century [4, p. 128]. But, along with the self-consciousness shift, the divergence of ethic took place, splitting into the "ethic of autonomy" and "ethic of divinity and community" [31] and setting distinctions between "religious and moral identities in the structure of personal identity" [11].

The spiritual vehicle of religion served as a means of commonality and social control, setting the norms of behaviour within the "ethic of divinity". Prescriptive by its nature, the ethic of divinity involves psychological purity and divinity concepts as key aspects and provides for practicing benevolence, self-restraint, and prudential behaviour. The culpability in this ethic is construed as a moral failure, a "failure in genuine love for God" [32] that "wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity" [32]. It follows that guilt roots in the communal relations. Therefore, even though the feeling of guilt is associated with the failure to meet one's moral obligations and relates to specific situations (*distrust, folly, guile, hatred, jealousy, participation* or *knowledge about wrongdoings, treachery, vehemence, wickedness*) (see Fig. 1) with no generalizations made over "global self" [13], the attachment system and commonality of religious identity is put at risk in pursuing the common well-being of the social entity such as the parish.

The guilt reaction is triggered not solely by the censure of a moral failure or harm caused to someone, but by the appraisal that the failure threatens the communion to the victim, close or even distant. A way to instill the feeling of guilt in the members of the community getting gradually reluctant to divinity ethic which is observed in the linkage to religious linguoideologemes (*bevy, chant, chapel, clergyman, convent, ecclesiastic, faith, grace, nun, purity, salvation, spirit,* and *tolerance*) is to point at the moral failure and its recovery through the prism of the social standpoint (*confessor, traitor, villain, wretch, waywardness, disgrace, scandal, propriety, mien, opinion, vengeance, leniency,* and *dignity*). The action tendency attributed to the emotion, noticed in the co-occurrence networks, (*acquiescence, burden, confession, doubt, extenuation, misery, remorse,* and *suffering*) represents the schemas for moral behaviour and self-regulation in the Victorian age.


**Fig. 1. Co-occurrence network chart of linguoideologeme *guilt* in *Mary Barton* by Gaskell, 1848
(generated with the help of KH Coder)**

Importantly, the network of the target file GUILT displays strong edges to the lexical representation of the ideologemes CRIME & PUNISHMENT (*accusation, ceremony, circumstance, client, counsel, crime, detection, guard, espionage,*

judge, *haunt*, *imputation*, *law*, *offence*, *proof*, *punishment*, and *suspect*) that exhibits the shift in moral regulation of the personal identity from religion to legislature authorized to identify and determine the guilt in relation to a failure.

The complexity of the guilt issue is predetermined by the tendency of fusion between guilt and shame in the cultivation of even stronger psychological symptoms of intrapersonal pain. Webster's Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1886) testifies to the interconnectedness of the emotions by providing the definition to *shame* in the dictionary entry: "a painful sensation excited by a consciousness of guilt, or of having done something which injures reputation; or of the exposure of that which nature or modesty prompts us to conceal; hence, decency; decorum" [37, p. 1213].

The differentiation between guilt and shame can be based on the triple criteria: the level of the publicity of transgression, types of eliciting events, and the construal of perpetration either as self or behaviour failure [34]. Among the distinction criteria, little differences have been discerned between shame-inducing and guilt-inducing eliciting events, with no direct correspondence to particular situations [17]. Therefore, moral transgressions may equally yield guilt and shame, guilt though is associated with the actions violating duties, while shame is more likely to be linked to violations of the ethic of community (*abnormality*, *barrenness*, *corruption*, *debt*, *defeat*, *dilapidation*, *dirt*, *failure*, *hindrance*, *impertinence*, *incapacity*, *incompleteness*, *lapse*, *liaison*, *loss*, *mischance*, *misery*, *nothingness*, *old-maidinism*, and *penury*) or divinity (*cowardice*, *dishonor*, *falsehood*, *folly*, *hypocrisy*, *injustice*, *perversion*, *pride*, *treachery*, and *witchery*).

Furthermore, guilt and shame can equally be public which relates both to publicity of eliciting events and emotion experiencing [34]. The difference lies within the centeredness of experiencers' concerns: guilt is "decentered" with the focus on behaviour distanced from the self, while shame is more egocentric expressing concern with other's evaluation of the self [7]. Guilt is related to "the criminality and consequent exposure to punishment or legal penalty resulting from willful disobedience of law or from morally wrong activities" [37, p. 596]. Whereas shame is construed as a "reproach incurred or suffered; dishonor; ignominy; derision; contempt" [37, p. 1213].

The degree of endorsement of religion and the subsequent psychological outcomes at an individual level is particularly important for the Victorian era to consider the correlation between shame and guilt. It appears that the shift from the "identified religiosity" of a mature religious personality (marked by the adoption of religious behaviour as personally chosen) to the "introjected religion internalization" (based on social pressures) [2, p. 136] associated positively with anxiety, depression and social dysfunction and negatively with self-esteem. It follows that in an act of value transgression a more autonomous form of religiosity is linked to the emotion of guilt even more than to an attempt at finding self and others' approval of extrinsic religiosity [2, p. 136] eliciting the painful feeling of shame. With the transition of guilt as a self-censure towards the institutionally governed practices, shame as an emotional experience became even more intensely an indicator of internal policing and ignominy in the face of public. Therefore, the rise of the guilt-culture was marked by the shift to shame in the intensity of the feeling against the contravention of moral standards. Consequently, with the loss of the emotional zeal of guilt, the bias resulted in a continuous deterioration of the opposition virtue: sin as it can be substantiated in the pages of the Victorian novel:

"The constricted human sympathies of these people – their hostility to science – their superstitious adhesion to every word of the Bible, whatever geology or philology may say – their arrogant assumption of absolute rightness – their greater reverence for certain mystical and unprovable doctrines than for active and practical virtues – their unnatural asceticism, which has none of the manliness of stoicism in it, but is founded on the <u>*crushing idea of Sin*</u>*, that pallid spectre everywhere, even in our affections – in a word, their sanctimoniousness, gave me in my early youth a repulsion for the whole school, which I retain to my cooler and soberer old age"* (E. Linton "Autobiography of Christopher Kirkland" retrieved from CLMET 3.1).

The study has shown a sudden drop in the number of edges in the target file in the Victorian novel by the end of the century with the establishing of new connections to the lexemes designating philosophical issues of life, fate, death, consciousness, time, and humanity.

3.2. Shame and embarrassment as drivers of Victorian moral responsibility

With regard to self-censure, shame is believed to be attributed to a dispositional flaw of the "global self" [11] in a failure to fulfill one's moral obligations, as is observed in the Victorian novel, in the face of the community (*banishment*, *blame*, *derision*, *goosing*, *infamy*, *mockery*, *nothingness* or *pity*, *leniency* and *solidarity*) or God (*demon*, *fall*, *miscreant*, *self-indulgence*, *sin*, *sinner* or *confession*, *docility*, *expiation*, *purification*, *repentance*, *rescue*, *retaliation*, *sanctity*, and *virtue*) (for illustration see Fig. 2).

чDefined as "an internalization of the moral judgment that comes from outside, from the group" [4, p. 133], shame retains "the belief that one is, or is perceived by others to be, inferior or unworthy of affection or respect because of one's actions, thoughts, circumstances, or experiences" [30]. The painfulness of shame triggered by the recognition of one's defective interdependent self [9, p. 860] is represented through the self-deprecating action tendencies as is seen in the Victorian novel (*rebuke*, *reproach*, *self-condemnation*, *self-abasement*, and *suffering*). Withdrawal and acquiescence (*affliction*, *avoidance*, *bitterness*, *coolness*, *disillusionment*, *fear*, *grief*, *helplessness*, *mournfulness*, *reserve*, *silence*, *sullenness*, *slough*, *woe*, and *wretchedness*) are much less frequently interfered by flashes of anger (*assault*, *destruction*, *degradation*, *irritation*, *revolt*, *resolution*, *tumult*).

The responsibility for contravention of morality principles, similarly to guilt, yields not only public condemnation, but legal convictions too, exhibiting the linkage of moral ideologemes to the ideologemes LAW & POLICYMAKING (*authority*, *law*, *license*, *justice*, *outlawry*, *vindication*) and CRIME & PUNISHMENT (*accusation*, *crime*, *perpetrator*, *prison*, *punishment*, *suspicion*). Conspicuously, the shame linguoideologeme networks exhibit the linkage to other moral emotions phylogenetically prior to shame, such as shyness and embarrassment (*confusion* and *perturbation*) referring mainly to appearance (*attire*, *gown*, *collar*, *linen*, *buskin*, and *clasp*), and family relations (*father*, *generation*, *home*, *home-thrust*, *mother*, *parent*).

**Fig. 2. Co-occurrence network chart of linguoideologeme *shame* in *Dombey and Son* by Dickens, 1844**

Fig. 3. Co-occurrence network chart of linguoideologeme *embarrassment* in *The Moonstone* by Collins, 1868

Although shame and embarrassment may equally require social context, embarrassment is differentiated from shame since it is prior to self-evaluation and doesn't trigger the damaged self [20, p. 84]. Embarrassment eliciting events encompass the practices of public exposure (*acquaintance*, addressed by *title*, *admiration*, *affair*, *compliment*, *confession*, formal *entrance*, *frankness*, *mirror* reflection, *presence*, *recollection*, and *tete-a-tete*); confusion of mind or public affairs, and manners (*fault*, *compulsion*, *lapse*, *mistake*, *stupidity*, and *shams*, *lies*, *word*, *tongue*, *remark*, *rencounter*, *treason*). Furthermore, the meaning 3f embarrassment that involves also a state of "perplexity arising from insolvency, or from temporary inability to discharge debts" [37, p. 438] substantiates its correlation to the ideologemes of FINANCE (*creditor*, *debt*, *destitution, finance*, *improvidence*, *money*, *poverty*, *resource*, *sum*) and BUSINESS (*attendant*, *business*, *company*, *guard*, *laywer*, *market-town*, *grocer*, *personage*, *proctor*, *proxy*, *solicitor*) (for illustration see Fig. 3).

The interrelation of the ideologemes is observed in the fictional texts of the Victorian novel: "*By an odd arrangement – like everything else in the story of this pair, a result of <u>social and personal embarrassments</u> – Monica's belongings, including her apparel for the day, were previously dispatched to the bridegroom's house, whither, in company with Virginia, the bride went early in the morning*" (G. Gissing "The Odd Women" retrieved from CLMET 3.1).

The action tendencies of experiencing the embarrassment (*agitation*, *confusion*, *contempt*, *enmity*, *hostility*) are aimed at overcoming the uneasiness of the feeling (*agony*, *difficulty, diffidence*, *disturber*, *hesitation*, *perplexity*, *zeal*) by either resigning oneself to the fact (*consciousness*, *insight*, *ostrich instinct*, *self-composure*, *regulation*, *relief*, *kindness*) or demonstrating nonchalance and outward compliance with decorum (*apology*, *careless gaiety*, *confidence*, *courtesy*, *courage*, and *determination*).

4. Conclusions

The proliferation of VICTORIAN MORALITY ideology was heavily supported by the waning ideology of RELIGION that gradually transferred its emotional zeal to the rising system of utilitarianism. Simultaneously, the society underwent a transition from the ethic of divinity and community to the ethic of autonomy, within which individualism was continuously taking over to establish a guilt-oriented culture with legislature as a predominant mechanism of moral regulation. The transition process was attended by the shift in the personal identity of Victorians highlighting the priority of moral identity over religious identity. The tendency evinced the departure from the identified religiosity of a mature parishioner to the introjected religion internalization associated with anxiety, depression and negative self-esteem. This divergence led to a much-discussed phenomenon of Victorian prudery, a commonly recognized hallmark of the time. The transitory process was facilitated by the negatively-valenced self-conscious moral emotions of guilt, shame, and embarrassment.

Guilt and shame remained inseparable, sharing similar eliciting events, and publicity of transgressing the moral rules. Though, the construal of perpetration either as self or behaviour failure distinguished shame-inducing from guilt-inducing experiences respectively. As guilt was giving its way in cultivating the feeling of solidarity and established its links to the ideologemes of CRIME & PUNISHMENT, the obligation for individual moral responsibility was taking over. Meanwhile, the commonality was preserved under an even more intense feelings of shame and ontologically prior to it embarrassment. The deduction is maintained by a qualitative machine-based content analysis that provides with the data on the suggestive extensive linkage of the linguoideologemes *shame* and *embarrassment* to the lexical units representing self-deprecating and adaptive action tendencies that could purportedly establish exemplar emotional experience schema underlying the Victorian moral identity.

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Анотація
І. ПІНІЧ. НЕГАТИВНІ МОРАЛЬНІ ЕМОЦІЇ САМОУСВІДОМЛЕННЯ У КОНСТРУЮВАННІ ВІКТОРІАНСЬКОЇ МОРАЛЬНОЇ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ (КОРПУСНЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ)

У статті розглянуто вплив негативних моральних емоцій самоусвідомлення на зсув у структурі вікторіанської індивідуальної ідентичності від релігійної до моральної. Автором стверджується, що такі зміни ознаменували становлення вікторіанської культури провини та позначили відхід від релігійної ідеології до ідеології вікторіанської моралі. Якісний контент-аналіз корпусних даних підтвердив робочу гіпотезу про транзитний механізм зміни ідеологій, спричиненої домінуванням відповідного емоційного репертуару.

Ключові слова: ідеологія, ідеологема, вікторіанська мораль, моральна ідентичність, релігійна ідентичність, моральні емоції самоусвідомлення, сором, провина, зніяковіння.

Аннотация
И. ПИНИЧ. НЕГАТИВНЫЕ МОРАЛЬНЫЕ ЭМОЦИИ САМООСОЗНАНИЯ В КОНСТРУИРОВАНИИ ВИКТОРИАНСКОЙ МОРАЛЬНОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ (КОРПУСНОЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ)

В статье рассмотрено влияние негативных эмоций самосознания на сдвиг в структуре викторианской индивидуальной идентичности от религиозной к моральной. Автором утверждается, что такие изменения ознаменовали становление викторианской культуры вины и отметили отход от религиозной идеологии к идеологии викторианской морали. Качественный анализ корпусных данных подтвердил рабочую гипотезу о транзитном механизме изменения идеологий, вызванного доминированием соответствующего эмоционального репертуара.

Ключевые слова: идеология, идеологема, викторианская мораль, моральная идентичность, религиозная идентичность, моральные эмоции самосознания, стыд, вина, смущение.

Summary
I. PINICH. NEGATIVE SELF-CONSCIOUS MORAL EMOTIONS IN CONSTRUCTING VICTORIAN MORAL IDENTITY (A CORPUS-BASED STUDY)

The study has been conducted within the research of emotion facilitators for the transition of ideologies. The paper maintains the hypothesis that a newly rising ideology of VICTORIAN MORALITY was grounded on the emotional zeal of the waning ideology of RELIGION. The ideological transition yielded the change in the structure of the personal identity of Victorians that resulted in the priority transfer from religious identity to moral identity. The departure from the identified religiosity and the bias to individualism favoured the rise of the guilt-oriented culture that propagated personal responsibility for moral perpetration in the face of legislative power. A machine-based qualitative content analysis exhibited a significant linkage of the linguoideologeme guilt to the ideologemes of CRIME & PUNISHMENT as observed in the co-occurrence network charts generated with the help of KH Coder. Inasmuch as guilt was giving its way in solidarity cultivation, the emotional experience of shame and embarrassment, associated with introjected religion internalization and public exposure, retrieved the function of commonality keeping. Attributed to dispositional flaw or gauche in meeting the public expectations, shame and embarrassment triggered the feeling of liability in the face of the society. The co-occurrence analysis of the linguoideologemes shame and embarrassment evinced the suggestive linkage to the emotional experience schemas representing self-deprecating and adaptive action tendencies of the Victorian moral identity.

Key words: ideology, ideologeme, Victorian morality, moral identity, religious identity, self-conscious moral emotions, shame, guilt, embarrassment.